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Abstract—Nuclear power plants have many different instru-
mentation and control (I&C) systems. Together, these systems
(and their various dependencies) form the overall I&C archi-
tecture, which needs to fulfill the principle of defence-in-depth.
The safety systems need to be sufficiently independent from the
normal operation systems to avoid common cause failure.
Semantic Web technologies use formal conceptual models—
ontologies—to associate meaning with unstructured data. The
knowledge base is built on named graphs, allowing complex
queries with reasoning. The results are based on more than just
statistical patterns.
In this paper, we demonstrate the use of an OWL ontology
to represent engineering knowledge about overall nuclear I&C
architectures. We show how, using flexible SPARQL queries, we
can then analyse the different dependencies between the I&C
systems. We have built a public case study based on a proposed
pressurised water reactor type. We detected several potential
design issues, which suggests the approach could improve nuclear
safety and support design work.
Index Terms—Control systems, Systems architecture, Semantic
Web, Nuclear power generation
I. INTRODUCTION
The overall instrumentation and control (I&C) system archi-
tecture of a nuclear power plant (NPP) has to fulfill the safety
principle of defence-in-depth (DiD). Defence-in-depth is the
primary means of preventing accidents and mitigating the
potential consequences of accidents [1]. It is based on multiple
successive layers of protection (DiD levels) independent of
each other.
However, total independence of the DiD levels is practically
impossible. If each I&C system would have its own instrumen-
tation, human-machine interface (HMI), power supply, etc.,
the overall architecture would not just be prohibitively costly,
but also complex, and difficult to operate or maintain—i.e.,
potentially less safe [2].
In designing the overall I&C architecture, it is nevertheless
crucial to ensure that the key safety requirements are achieved
and can be justified [1]. The attention to detail needs to be
the same as it is for the system of the highest safety class
connected to the architecture [3]. As the design proceeds, and
new details about the plant and its I&C systems become avail-
able, the architecture needs to be continuously re-evaluated [2].
Proper tool support is therefore paramount.
Knowledge management in nuclear organisations is often
centered around organisational and thematic structures [4].
Information security concerns, intellectual property rights,
and commercial interests of different stakeholders limit the
distribution of information [4]. The industry is relatively
conservative in adopting new technology, and the operated
systems are sometimes “on the brink of obsolescence” [4].
Information related to the overall I&C architecture can
therefore be scattered in different documents and systems.
Information models, if they exist, can be focused on some
particular view (e.g., functional vs. physical). To search and
combine the pieces of information into valuable knowledge,
we look to the Semantic Web.
The Semantic Web [5] is based on a vocabularies of shared
domain concepts and their relationships, i.e., ontologies [6].
An ontology language like OWL [7] can be used to formally
express the “meaning” of terms and their logical connections,
enabling machine interpretation. A knowledge base based on
Semantic Web technology runs on directed graphs, and can
answer complex queries.
In a context broader than just I&C, it has already been
shown [4] that Semantic Web techniques can be useful in
building rich knowledge models in nuclear applications.
In this paper, we present a method for ensuring that the
design solutions related to nuclear overall I&C architectures
are safe. We use a Semantic Web ontology to represent
knowledge over the architectures, in order to analyze prop-
erties related to defence-in-depth. We have built a public
case study around the proposed US variant of the European
Pressurised Water Reactor. We demonstrate how, based on an
OWL ontology, we can flexibly specify SPARQL [8] queries
addressing the different dependencies between I&C systems
in the architecture.
We introduce DiD requirements for overall I&C nuclear
architectures in Section II. We then briefly introduce Semantic
Web ontologies in Section III, and related research in Sec-
tion IV. In Section V, we describe our exemplar ontology,
and in Section VI, our case study. We discuss our results in
Section VII, and present our conlusions in Section VIII.
II. NUCLEAR OVERALL I&C ARCHITECTURES
According to an IAEA report on the topic [2], the overall
I&C architecture of a nuclear power plant is “the organization
of the complete set of I&C systems important to safety”.
This organisations includes the identification, classification
and segmentation of the systems, and the communication
pathways and signal handling. Architectural decisions include:
• the degree of independence between the DiD levels
• the manner in which non-safety systems are separated
from safety systems
• the number of independent channels in safety systems
• the degree of separation between the safety channels [2]
The Fukushima Da-ichi accident in 2011 highlighted the
importance of properly implementing the DiD principle [2].
Accordingly, the Western European Nuclear Regulators’ As-
sociation (WENRA) has proposed a refined DiD structure for
new reactor designs [1]. The DiD levels (and their associated
plant condition categories) are:
1) Prevention of abnormal operation and failures (normal
operation)
2) Control of abnormal operation and failures (anticipated
operational occurrences)
3) Control of accident to limit radiological releases and
prevent escalation to core melt conditions (3a: single
initiating events, 3b: multiple failure events)
4) Control of accidents with core melt to limit off-site
releases (core melt accidents)
5) Mitigation of radiological consequences of significant
releases of radioactive material [1]
The means to achieve independence between the I&C
systems on the different layers are separation (consisting of
physical separation, electrical isolation, functional indepen-
dence, independence of communication, and independence of
supply systems), and diversity [1], [2].
Physical separation is achieved trough distance and/or struc-
tural barriers.
Electrical isolation ensures that an electrical fault in one
system does not degrade a connected system.
Functional independence means that the system can com-
plete its functions without depending on information derived
from another system.
Independence from errors in data communication can be
achieved by guaranteed one-way communication, or determin-
istic data communication protocol.
Independence of support systems ensures that failures are
not propagated through, e.g., shared power supply systems, or
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems.
Diversity—the use of different technologies or design prin-
ciples in, e.g., backup systems—offers protection against com-
mon cause failure (CCF) [9].
In our approach, we aim at checking requirements related
to all of the above-mentioned aspects of the design.
III. SEMANTIC WEB ONTOLOGIES
The Semantic Web [5] aims to derive information from the
(often ill-structured and informal) Web through a semantic
theory for interpretation. By formally expressing the “mean-
ing” of the terms and their logical connections, we enable
computers to search and combine heterogeneous pieces of
data from different sources, based on an “understanding” of
what a human user would find a meaningful association. The
vision is that intelligent software agents could recognise and
create new, valuable knowledge by merging, categorizing, and
synthesizing scattered information [4].
The Semantic Web relies on the standards organisations
like the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) to specify and
develop languages to serve as the foundation [5].
An ontology is defined as vocabulary for a shared domain
of discourse [6], containing definitions of classes, individuals,
and relationships between them. Ontology languages like
OWL [7] aim at machine interpretability by having more
structures for expressing meaning (semantics) than languages
like XML or Resource Description Framework (RDF). OWL
supports different types of inference, e.g., subsumption and
classification, and several OWL reasoners have been devel-
oped [5]. Formally, OWL is an extension of RDF [7]. A
knowledge base (containing individuals of the classes the
ontology defines) can then be built on RDF triples—as a
directed, labeled graph. SPARQL [8] is a query language for
RDF graph patterns.
A knowledge base consists of two components, sometimes
referred to as TBox and ABox [10]. The TBox statements
describe general properties of concepts by defining sets of
individuals in terms of their properties. The ABox comprises
assertions on individual objects—statements about individuals
belonging to the sets described in the TBox.
A limitation to the use of Semantic Web ontologies is
that the source data needs to be written in (or mapped
to) RDF graph format, which can be error-prone. However,
Shapes Constraint Language (SHACL) [11] aids in data graph
validation against suitable constraints, and a SHACL processor
can automatically produce a validation report.
IV. RELATED RESEARCH
Ontologies have been applied in the nuclear I&C domain in
a few studies, with different viewpoints.
Recently, an ontology for nuclear deployment called DIA-
MOND is introduced in [12]. To facilitate the integration of
plant data from various IT systems, the authors have designed
an OWL ontology using the Protégé [13] ontology editor.
The ontology also includes I&C specific concepts (instruments
such as gauges, their status and current measured value,
manufacturer, location, configuration, etc.), but the overall
focus is on operations and maintenance, not on design. The
design aspect is mentioned in the scope of future work [12].
In [14], controlled natural language is used to express
functional requirements for I&C systems, in order to facilitate
formal verification of application software design. The experi-
mental tool in [14] relies on a domain ontology to specify the
allowed verbs and property names for the controlled language.
Compared to our work on the (non-functional) requirements
for the overall architecture level, the focus is on (functional)
requirements for the control logic within one I&C system.
Other studies on ontologies in the nuclear I&C domain
are similarly not focused on overall I&C architectures, and,
instead of an expressive ontology language, simply rely on a
XML vocabulary (examples include [15] on Safety Analysis
Reports (SAR), [16] on the licensing review process, and [17]
on managing aging relay equipment).
Reasons why an ontology suitable for our purpose has not
yet been developed, could include: (1) the niche market for
such an ontology, (2) the nuclear industry being conservative
in adopting novel technologies [4], and (3) many architecture
level issues only receiving more attention after the relatively
recent adoption of digital I&C in safety systems (leading to
highly integrated and interdependent architectures) [2].
For a recent overview on semantic technologies in the
nuclear domain, see also [4]. For a comprehensive list of I&C
related ontology projects in other industrial domains, see [18].
Like this paper, [19] deals with assessing DiD related prop-
erties for nuclear overall I&C architectures, but the analysis
was based on Architecture Analysis and Design Language
(AADL). AADL was found lacking features that would sup-
port analysis on the system-of-systems level, and more suited
for analysing different aspects of individual I&C systems.
Our work is an example of deterministic analyses, where
we check whether or not a certain dependency exists. An-
other question is the assessing the likelihood that the de-
pendency causes unacceptable risks for overall safety. Prob-
abilistic safety assessment (PSA) methods (e.g., [20]) are
useful in identifying weaknesses, and determining risk im-
pacts. Realistic assessment of overall safety would require a
balanced combination of both deterministic and probabilistic
approaches [21].
V. OVERALL I&C ARCHITECTURE ONTOLOGY
A. Competency questions






5) safety classification, and
6) failure tolerance
For each of these topics, we listed competency questions
(CQ) [22]. The full list is available online1. Examples of
questions in each of the above category are:
CQ1.2: Is there equipment belonging to system A in the
same physical space (building / room / cabinet / rack) as
equipment belonging to system B, which is meant to be
separated from system A?
CQ2.1: Is there electrical isolation in interfaces between
safety-classified and non-safety-classified systems?
CQ3.1: Is there an interface between systems in different
safety classes, so that information flows from lower to higher
safety class?
CQ4.3: Are there support systems common to systems that
have been allocated diverse functions?
CQ5.1: If equipment (including support systems) has been
allocated a function of certain safety class, is its safety
classification the same or higher?
1The competency questions, OWL files, and SPARQL queries for our case
study are available at: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5010644
CQ6.2: Are there at least as many redundant components
within a system as is the specified number of redundant
divisions for that system?
B. TBox—the classes
The ontology class structure and the object relationships
are based on previous conceptual work on I&C DiD mod-
elling [23], and a previous case study built around the planned
Hanhikivi-1 NPP using UML [24].
As illustrated in Figure 1, there are three main classes:
FunctionalEntity, PhysicalEntity, and Classification.
FunctionalEntity covers initiating events, DiD levels, and
I&C functions (and their parts and connections).
PhysicalEntity covers I&C systems (and the interfaces be-
tween them), I&C devices (e.g., sensors, processors, actua-
tors, HMI panels...), and support systems (e.g, power supply,
HVAC...).
Classification has subclasses such as SafetyClass, Seismic-
Category, which can be applied to either the functional or the
physical entities. There are also concepts for describing the
Technology used to implement the systems.
Some key data and object properties are also shown in
Figure 1. (See also Figure 4.)




We have built our case study around the proposed US variant
of the European Pressurised Water Reactor (U.S. EPR). The
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has published sections
of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) online [25].
A simplified view of the overall I&C architecture is shown
in Figure 2. Only a part of the I&C systems are shown.




• Risk Reduction Line
An example of a deliberate design choice against total
independence of the DiD levels is that a Preventive Line
normal operation system (PAS) shares actuators with the Main
Line safety systems (PS and SAS). Therefore, the prioritisation
logic—PACS—plays an important role ensuring that the Main
Line systems can always control accidents.
The Diverse Actuation System (DAS) is not shown in Fig-
ure 2. To account for the potential common cause failure of the
(software-based) Main Line systems, the non-programmable
DAS performs diverse reactor trip and cooling functions. (DAS
is actually not a separate system, but a non-safety-classified
part of PAS based on hardwired logic [26].)
Failure tolerance within an I&C system is achieved trough
redundancy—having several redundant subsystems placed in
physically separated divisions. Main Line systems PS and SAS
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Fig. 1. Key classes and properties from our ontology.
Main Control Room work stations















































Fig. 2. Overall I&C architecture of the U.S. EPR (modified from [25])
PAS = Process Automation System
PACS = Priority and Actuator Control System
PICS = Process Information and Control System
PS = Protection System
RCSL = Reactor Control, Surveillance and Limitation System
SA I&C = Severe Accident I&C
SAS = Safety Automation System
SICS = Safety Information and Control System
Using WENRA’s DiD structure [1], the Preventive Line
would correspond with lines 1 and 2, the Main Line with line
3(a), and the Risk Reduction Line with line 4. (As such, the
U.S. EPR DiD architecture would not necessarily fulfill the
current requirements in Western Europe.)
Although an U.S.EPR project was never commissioned,
EPR plants have been built in China, and are under construc-
tion in Finland, France, and the UK. The design solutions used
in the overall I&C architecture to address DiD requirements



















Fig. 3. The Defence-in-Depth lines for the U.S. EPR overall I&C architecture
(modified from [26])
TG I&C = Turbine Generator I&C
B. ABox—the individuals
From the FSAR, we were able to collect data on 24
I&C systems, 156 I&C functions, 35 system interfaces, and
around 400 input/output (I/O) points (not counting the 4-
fold redundancy used for many measurements). However, the
documents only list the I/O points for two Main Line systems:
PS and SAS. We could therefore not base any DiD related
checks on the I/O point data.
We assigned identifiers for the functions and interfaces.
We assumed, e.g., the safety classification of each function.
We also defined requirements for the overall architecture not
specified in the FSAR itself.
We collected the data into MS Excel sheets for easy
manipulation, and used Excel’s string parsing functions to
generate the RDF/OWL triplets for the ABox. The OWL file
is available online1.
The property assertions for PS are shown in Figure 4, along
with a partial view of the TBox class hierarchy in Protégé.
Fig. 4. Partial view of the class hierarchy in Protégé, and property assertions
for the ICSystem individual PS.
C. SPARQL queries
The full list of SPARQL queries is available online1, along
with our notes on the query results.




In addition, the empty prefix : refers to our TBox, and the
prefix USEPR: to our ABox.
The first example is for a CQ on electrical isolation: “Is
there equipment in support systems that support two different
I&C systems that are meant to be electrically separated?”. In
the query, we look for two I&C systems, where exactly one
of them is safety class S, so that there is a single system or
device that provides support (power supply, HVAC, etc.—any
subPropertyOf supports) to both I&C systems:










The second example is for a CQ on communication indepen-
dence: “Are there interfaces across DiD lines?”. In the query,
we look for two I&C systems that have an interface, so that
the systems are associated with different DiD levels:







FILTER (?DidLevelA != ?DidLevelB)
}
The third example is for a CQ on safety classification: “Are
the components of a system of the same (or higher) safety
class as the system?”:











We ran the SPARQL queries in Protégé.
We did not expect the U.S. EPR architecture to necessarily
fulfill the requirements we based our SPARQL queries on.
Many of the requirements we wrote were not based on the
FSAR itself. The objective was to evaluate a technique, not
actually assess a real design. We got the following results:
Physical separation: The FSAR does not contain sufficient
information about the placement of I&C systems and equip-
ment in rooms, cabinets, or racks.
Electrical separation: Many of the interfaces between safety-
classified and non-safety-classified systems are not stated to be
electrically isolated in the FSAR.
Communication independence: There is an interface from
DAS (safety class NS-AQ) to PACS, SICS, and reactor trip
breakers (RTB) (safety class S). We assume that these are de-
liberate design choices for, e.g., the prioritisation of commands
for shared actuators, and SICS is used for monitoring, only.
There are also interfaces from RCSL and TG I&C (NS) to
PICS (NS-AQ) for monitoring.
Diversity: DAS performs reactor trip functions that are
intended diverse to the trip functions implemented in PS.
However, both systems use RTB to trip the reactor, and both
rely on SICS to implement the manual trip functions.
Safety classification: PS and SAS (S) have components—
Gateway and Service Unit—that are non-safety-classified
(NS). DAS (NS-AQ) is powered by a NS power supply system.
Failure tolerance: PAS, SAS and RCSL are specified as
four-redundant systems, but each have only one Gateway and
Service Unit. DAS and SCDS are also specified as four-
redundant, but each have two-redundant power supply systems.
VII. DISCUSSION
A. Our contribution
Our experiments showed that OWL supports the kind of ma-
chine reasoning over conceptual relationships that is relevant
for analyzing requirements related to defence-in-depth. The
user can pose questions that require the computer to deduce
different classifications and connections, all of which are not
explicitly stated in the source data. SPARQL makes it straight-
forward to pose questions with graph patterns (but whether
SPARQL is a particularly user-friendly query language is a
subjective matter).
By publishing the all the case study details, we invite other
researchers to repeat, question, or further refine our work.
B. Design optimisation
As already stated above, many of our competency questions
or SPARQL queries were not based on any requirements stated
for the U.S. EPR I&C architecture in the FSAR documents,
but our own experience. Our query results are not meant to be
interpreted as criticism. The overall I&C architecture of the
EPR built in Finland, for example, is also quite different.
Nevertheless, our results illustrate the challenge of opti-
mising the overall I&C architecture. Fore example, DAS is
meant to be diverse from PS and SAS, but DAS also shares
actuators and HMI with PS and SAS. Although the chain from
the sensors (and HMI) to the actuators is based on hardwired
logic (and therefore provides protection against the common
cause failure of the software-based PS and SAS), the diverse
function—as a whole—still relies on same technology, design
principle, supplier, etc..
Still, our query results are not necessarily symptoms of
problems, but examples of deliberate design optimisation. The
challenge is to build a plant that is economically feasible to
construct, operable, maintainable, while also safe. Assessing
the safety aspect requires easy access to a large set of data,
and running fairly complex chains of reasoning.
C. Further work
In an effort to find the best formal modelling technique for
I&C DiD assessment, we will next attempt similar analyses us-
ing Prolog [27] and/or algorithms such as Boolean satisfiability
(SAT) [28] and Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) [29]. If
the Semantic Web approach is found most feasible, we will
need to further extend and refine our ontology.
Eventually, we also hope to demonstrate the technique we
will find most applicable in the context of real plant project,
e.g., the Finnish Hanhikivi-1 NPP.
For the proposed concept to be practically applicable, the
query specification and result browsing need to be made
user-friendly. An flexible solution is needed for automatically
generating the individuals (ABox) based on information that
is scattered in different systems, with potentially different
interfaces and representation formats.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrated an approach for analysing
safety requirements related to the overall I&C architecture
of a nuclear power plant. We used an OWL ontology to
facilitate machine reasoning, and then used SPARQL to flex-
ibly specify queries related to defence-in-depth properties—
electrical isolation, communication independence, diversity,
safety classification, and failure tolerance. In our case study,
we detected different potential design issues in the overall I&C
architecture design of a proposed NPP type.
The kind of tool we are proposing has a niche market.
Defence-in-depth is a principle also applied in other domains
(e.g., aviation), but the overall I&C architectures are seldom
as complex as they are in a modern nuclear power plant.
Still, safety is not the only justification for paying attention
the overall architecture design. In order for the plant projects to
be economically viable, the design and the licensing processes
need to run smoothly. The overall I&C architecture is an early
design input, but it is also constantly updated as the design
progresses. Practical tools for analysing and demonstrating that
the different iterations all fulfill the DiD principles are a key
to success.
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